Another round of corporate governance reforms in the United Kingdom: implications for directors in the financial sector by McCalman, James & Young, Angus
Another Round of Corporate Governance Reforms in the United Kingdom: 
Implications for Directors in the Financial Sector 
 
Prof. James McCalman1 and Dr. Angus Young2 
 
Abstract 
Directors of listed entities in the United Kingdom are about to face greater demands from recent 
discussions on corporate governance reforms, in particular compliance with the obligations in 
section 172 of the Companies Act 2006. This article argues that leadership in a multi-
stakeholder regime has become more important than ever. 
 
Introduction 
The recent collapse of Carillion has put existing corporate governance requirements under the 
microscope once again and called into question the rules that apply to listed entities. How 
could one of the UK’s largest construction companies fail so dramatically? Even given 
regular and consistent reforms corporate collapses in the UK seemed to re-occur with 
shocking regularity. If there are no full-proof solutions to these problems, one thing is certain, 
more and more compliance obligation rests on the shoulders of company directors. This is 
particularly true in the financial sector where new regulatory measures have been introduced 
in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
This paper explores the notion of the multi-stakeholder regime and consider the implications 
for directors in the banking and financial sector. Recent debates and proposals to reform 
corporate governance are pivotal to gaining insight to the changes to come in particular those 
associated with stakeholder engagement. We explore the obligations towards various 
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stakeholders that are implied under directors’ duties and the Corporate Governance Code (CG 
Code). This then leads us into discussion of corporate leadership in a multi-stakeholder 
regime and to recommendations for directors in the financial sector of ways in which a multi-
stakeholder environment might be embraced by forward looking boards who are prepared for 
the challenges ahead. 
 
Recent Corporate Governance Reform Proposals 
In the past few decades the UK has undergone a number of corporate governance reforms.3 
Two of the most significant were the Companies Act 2006 which provided a major revision 
and modernization of company law, and the 1992 Cadbury Report 1992 which brought in the 
first CG Code. As a result directors in the UK have to comply with a number of statutory 
obligations (for example, sections 170 to 176) and listed entities have an additional CG Code 
to satisfy (the most recent revision was in 2016).4  
 
In a related vein, there have been a number of Inquiries held in the aftermath of the corporate 
governance failures at BHS and Sports Direct in 2016.5 Currently, there are three significant 
examinations that may seek to address some of the governance issues regarding Carillion plc. 
These are the House of Commons’ Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) 
Committee’s Report on Corporate Governance; the Government’s Response to the Green 
Paper on Corporate Governance Reform; and the Financial Reporting Council’s Proposed 
Revisions to the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
  
The House of Commons’ Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee’s Report on 
Corporate Governance noted that the key requirements on company directors relating to 
corporate governance were the duties specified in the Companies Act 2006, in particular 
section 172.6 The Report stated that:7 
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We believe that more effective measures are required to ensure that directors 
demonstrably take seriously their duties to have regard to other stakeholders and the 
long-term consequences of decisions. This can best be achieved by requiring more 
specific and accurate reporting, supported by robust enforcement. 
In addition,8 
We recommend that the FRC amends the Code to require informative narrative 
reporting on the fulfilment of section 172 duties. Boards must be required to explain 
precisely how they have considered each of the different stakeholder interests, 
including employees, customers and suppliers and how this has been reflected in 
financial decisions. They should also explain how they have pursued the objectives of 
the company and had regard to the consequences of their decisions for the long term, 
however they choose to define this. Where there have been failures to have due regard 
to any one of these interests, these should be addressed directly and explained. 
A similar position was taken in the Government’s Response to the Green Paper on Corporate 
Governance Reform. The Response noted that:9 
Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 already requires the directors of a company to 
have regard to these wider interests in pursuing the success of the company, but a large 
number of respondents thought that this aspect of the legal framework could be made 
to work more effectively through improved reporting, Code changes, raising awareness 
and more guidance.  
 
The Government intended to announce a number of measures, one of which is to:  
 
(iv) Introduce secondary legislation to require all companies of significant size (private 
as well as public) to explain how their directors comply with the requirements of section 
172 to have regard to employee and other interests;  
. 
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Finally, the Financial Reporting Council’s Proposed Revisions to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code enhance the obligations in section 172 aimed at generating and preserving 
value for shareholders for the long term.10 Furthermore, it noted that:11 
An effective board will have a clear understanding of how that value is dependent on 
relationships with its stakeholders and will be able to explain how these relationships 
help deliver the company’s purpose. It understands the importance of dialogue with 
shareholders, workforce and wider stakeholders and is pro-active in ensuring that such 
dialogue takes place. 
 
In terms of better relations with the workforce and wider stakeholders, the proposal stated 
that:12 
 
Boards should start by identifying their different sets of stakeholders. This will include 
the workforce, customers, suppliers, which could be particular to the sector or location. 
Boards should seek input from these stakeholders to ensure they have a rounded view 
of how the company does business and the impact of its activities. In addition to formal 
and informal engagement with the workforce, possible sources of information might 
include: 
 Contacts with key customers 
 Customer complaints and satisfaction data 
 Supplier feedback 
 Social media 
 Contacts with interest groups and the local community 
 
[D]irectors should be accountable by explaining their decisions and how they have 
taken account of the interests of different stakeholders. This will include being able to 
explain how the benefits in terms of the long-term success of the company outweigh 
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any negative impacts, and any action the company plans to take to mitigate those 
impacts. 
 
What is clear from the discourse of the recent corporate governance reforms is the desire to 
ensure directors exercise their duties in section 172 of Companies Act 2006. The proposed 
way of doing so is through the use of disclosure in the Annual Report. To appreciate the 
rationale of the proposed reforms it is crucial to examine section 172 in greater detail. 
 
Directors’ Duty to Promote the Success of the Company 
Section 172 of Companies Act 2006 was a product of Company Law Review, which 
produced nine consultation papers and took three years to complete.13 One of the key debates 
in the codification of directors’ duties was between pluralism and enlightened self-interest 
approach.14  According to Lady Justice Arden, the then Chair of the review, the latter meant, 
‘[t]he company is to create value for the benefit of shareholders, but this should be done by 
taking a long-term view of the company where possible and thus the relationships which the 
company has with suppliers, employees, the community and so on have to be fostered.’15  
 
The statutory formulation imposes legal duties onto directors to promote the success of the 
company. This provision is said to have deviated from a narrow view of the common law rule 
in Percival v Wright by broadening from shareholders to include other stakeholders such as, 
employees and creditors.16 Yet, Lady Justice Arden maintained that:17  
The Company Law Review did not think changing the law was necessary to achieve 
that, but it thought there should be a statement is to which pointed directors in favour 
of the long-term approach in order to give them guidance and in to help them focus on 
the need for foster relationships employees, customers and so on. 
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There are a few factors when considering the interpretation of this statutory provision. The 
first is ‘good faith’.18 In Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Langport Ltd19 the court held that 
the duty is subjective. Keay notes that, ‘[n]o reasonableness test was to be applied in relation 
to what directors had done. Whether a director had breached his or her duty came down to a 
consideration of the director's state of mind and provided that directors believed in good faith 
that they were acting in the best interests of the company they could not be said to be in 
breach.’20 As such, certain elements of the common rule test are preserved. 
 
The second is the definition of ‘success’.21 Undoubtedly, the term ‘success’ is not easy to 
pinpoint with great certainty because companies can operate with profit and occasional 
losses. Nevertheless, the term creates a perception or at least a concern that corporate failure 
could mean the interests of shareholders were not served. The impression would be that 
directors of failed businesses might at some stage make decisions resulting in corporate 
collapse. However, does it mean the statutory requirements of ‘success’ was contravened? 
The only statutory guide to ‘success’ is that directors must have regard to ‘the likely 
consequences of any decision in the long term’.22 According to Hudson this, ‘[b]olsters 
the need to look to the larger context of corporate actions over time.’23 
 
The third concerns the ‘benefit members as a whole’. The list of stakeholders and concerns 
would appear to be troubling at first sight because directors have to be answerable to many 
and even competing priorities.24 Lowy argued that;25 
The statutory re-conceptualisation of the duty does not mean that non-shareholder 
constituencies rank equal to shareholders or have some independent priority in 
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directors’ decision-making, but rather consideration of their interests should only 
extend to the point where this promotes the success of the company for the benefit of 
its members… 
 
Therefore, it would be fair to conclude that shareholders’ interests would remain paramount; 
the only change is the broadening of the scope of directors’ considerations when decisions 
about the company are made. There again, whether the inclusion of wider interests of the 
company would in fact improve decisions made by directors, only time will tell. 
 
It is important to note that in spite of the new statutory formulation the right of action remains 
the company. Even if directors breach section 172 shareholders can ratify those acts under 
section 239 thereby reinforcing the shareholder-centred approach of this statutory provision. 
 
The wider Stakeholders and their Interests  
Since the introduction of this new statutory provision there have been certain dicta indicating 
directors should take into account wider interests.26 Whilst shareholders’ interests remains 
sacred, incorporating wider interests could create more uncertainties for directors with 
multiple and at times competing interests to consider before reaching a decision.27 
 
Recent cases have suggested that the obligations towards creditors were incorporated into 
interpreting section 172. In Secretary State for Business, Innovation and Skills v Akbar28, 
concerning the disqualification of directors of a family company, which at a time was on the 
brink of insolvency, it was held that the directors failed to act in the best interest of the 
company when they entered into certain transactions that led to the company’s demise. In 
another case Ball (Liquidator of PV Solar Solutions Ltd) v Hughes [2017] EWHC 3228 (Ch), 
the directors of an insolvent company had made unjustified credit entries against their 
directors’ loan accounts. It was held that the directors breached their fiduciary duties under 
section 172 to act in the best interests of the creditors because they had misapplied the 
company’s assets for their own benefit.   
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 With regards to employees, it would be incorrect to suggest that their concerns are treated as 
equal to shareholders.29 Instead, it suggests that directors could use section 172 defensively 
when sued by shareholders arguing that a decision is or was made against the interests of 
shareholders.30 In Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc31 the directors justified the continued 
operation of the company to protect the interests of employees. Thus, satisfying employees’ 
demands so as to secure their willingness to work effectively with management could be 
justifiable in the reading of promotion of the long-term interests of the company,32 even if 
there is a higher price to pay in the short term in the form of for example, wage increases and 
other benefits. 
 
There are other elements directors should include in their consideration such as, the 
company’s operational impact on the environment.33 Some might argue that directors might 
prefer to minimize the financial costs with regards to environmental matters as good financial 
management to further the interests of shareholders. Yet when things go terribly wrong like 
an incident that creates an environmental disaster, without the implementation of preventive 
measures and the advice of technical experts regarding environmental matter, it is unlikely 
directors can demonstrate the requirements section 172 are met. To this end, spending more 
on environmental protection measures could be arguable justified or used defensively against 
shareholders’ claims of excessiveness.  
 
Despite the aims of the enlightened shareholders value approach embedded in section 172, 
directors might find the stakeholder’s approach to corporate governance better satisfy the 
concerns of stakeholders. Clarke commented that;34  
The growing emphasis upon customer relations, employee relations, supplier relations 
and indeed the investor relations, is an indication of the way managers are grappling 
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with the need to satisfy the interests of more complex constituencies than shareholder 
theory would suggest. The defence of shareholder rights sits uneasily with how 
increasingly companies are managed. 
Therefore, the overriding focus on furthering shareholders’ interest vis-à-vis taking into 
account various stakeholders becomes less self-evident.35 
 
Another stakeholder that has not been explicitly mentioned in section 172, but of direct 
relevance to the financial sector in the UK is the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). With 
the introduction of the Senior Managers Regime (SMR), the influence of FCA as a 
stakeholder in a financial services company is enormous. McCalman, Young and Chan noted 
that under this new regime; 36 
 
[S]enior bankers must ensure they have full control over their areas of responsibility. 
Everything senior managers do or do not do must be defensible, with evidence to 
support those decisions...[I]n particular, senior bank managers have to ensure whether 
everything they did or did not do at work satisfies the legal test of taking reasonable 
steps to prevent regulatory breaches from occurring under their watch or continue to 
occur…[F]inally, the duty of an assigned responsible person to report to the regulators 
(FCA and PRA, or either) for breaches or disciplinary actions against an employee 
means that the banks are in effective assisting the regulators to police their staff..  
 
In short, the FCA wields enormous power over senior management which includes directors 
of banks and insurance companies. SMR will shortly apply to all financial services 
companies in the UK. The influence the FCA holds in its disciplinary arsenal against 
directors are huge, including the power to vet and approve senior appointees as well as 
‘prohibiting individuals from carrying on regulated activities.’37  
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 Even though the SMR is a new measure, there were the enforcement actions against a 
director under Approved Persons regime (a pre-SMR requirement). In Burns v Financial 
Conduct Authority38, the regulator imposed a financial penalty of £154,800 and prohibited a 
non-executive director from carrying on regulated activities as an authorised person under 
sections 66 and 56 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The Approved Person 
(predecessor to the SMR), is a non-executive director of two mutual societies. The regulator 
found she failed to disclose conflicts of interest and had used her positions to further her own 
commercial interests breaching the ‘fit and proper’ test for approved persons. The plaintiff 
initially referred the decision of the regulator to the Upper Tribunal and then later appealed to 
the Court of Appeal. The findings in both the Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal were 
that the plaintiff breached directors’ duties under section 175 and 177 of the Companies Act 
2006.  
 
The implications for this case is that the FCA could take action against directors for breach of 
their statutory duties, and those actions are powers to prohibit individuals from carrying on 
regulated activities in effect dismissing as well as disqualifying the director from the financial 
sector. FCA’s enforcements need not require litigation or prosecution, they are powers 
conferred under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 for the regulator to make an 
assessment because Approved Persons, and now SMR is a licensing requirement. As such, 
the FCA was exercising a delegated power to assess whether the licensee has breached 
licensing requirements. Therefore, amongst all the stakeholders of the financial services 
sector in the UK, the regulator FCA is one of the most influential and powerful.  
 
Leadership under a Multi-Stakeholder Regime 
From recent developments in corporate governance reform and the practicalities involved in 
section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, the indications are that directors in the UK, and in 
particular the financial sector, will be further exposed to leading and managing in a multi-
stakeholder governance environment. How does this affect the notion of director behaviour 
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and development?  There is a distinct sense that regulating disclosure of what the Board does 
is not strong enough.  In a 2014 special issue of the Academy of Management Journal 
devoted to rethinking governance in management research, the Editors noted that: 39 
 
Recent corporate activity and views, however, have an expanded view of governance 
as involving stewardship and leadership, in addition to the narrower financial prudence 
role…[w]e refer to governance as leadership systems, managerial control protocols, 
property rights, decisions rights, and other practices that give organizations their 
authority and mandates for action. 
 
Certainly, corporate governance is undergoing a quantum shift from box-ticking compliance 
to demands for a leadership imperative from Chairmen, CEOs and Boards alike which 
enables and empowers business performance along a number of dimensions other than 
profitability. Will Moynahan, Managing Partner for Board Practice at Heidrick and Struggles 
argued that: 40  
 
 The demand for dynamic governance is based on two realisations. First, leadership 
 starts at the board level. Second, governance is a means of enabling and driving 
 business performance. All things being equal, well-governed companies excel. The 
 best companies do not wait to be governed, they shape the debate and set best 
 practice with agile and responsive leadership that adapts quickly to the changing 
 circumstances of business. 
  
The Heidrick and Struggles Report, Towards Dynamic Governance in 2014 analysed the 
board composition and habits of Europe's top 400 publicly listed companies. The report 
identified six key characteristics that defined a new era of dynamic governance and used 
these to construct a board effectiveness survey, completed by 236 senior board members 
across Europe. The six characteristics were: 41 
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1. Deep Business Knowledge – the need for board members to understand the 
 commercial DNA of the company and possess deep insights into the business. The 
 report reveals that one in five boards in Europe still combine the role of CEO and 
 Chairman, holding management to account becomes a challenge in such
 circumstances.  
 
2. Diversity of Thought - Boards need to contain a range of members from diverse 
backgrounds to encapsulate stakeholder not shareholder interest. The study found that 
boards are becoming more international in their mix with non-national directors 
making up 30% of the director pool in Europe. However, female representation was 
poor. 
 
3. Engaged Leadership - The best chairmen work hard on team dynamics; this requires a 
sophisticated understanding of people. 93% of survey respondents identified the 
leadership styles of the Chairman as an important contributor to board effectiveness.  
However, only 76% of respondents thought their own Chairman was doing a 
satisfactory job in this respect.  
 
4. Strategic alignment and execution - Boards must use their knowledge and experience 
to help executives develop robust and sustainable strategies.  
 
5. Capacity to adapt - Boards must do more to create the conditions within which 
innovation and adaptation can thrive.  
 
6. Leadership talent - Talented people lie at the heart of dynamic governance and drive 
the boardroom's transformation agenda. 
 
 
In the financial sector, the focus is on how Senior Managers have to deal with SMR, AND 
good corporate governance. This means a focus on a multiple stakeholders’ model of 
governance. This suggests that the complexity of governance and leadership are multiplied to 
be accountable to various stakeholders and coming to terms with competing demands of 
different stakeholders. To do so, we would suggest that new reforms might trigger changing 
reporting processes but boards will need to provide evidence of dealing with differing 
stakeholders. We would suggest that a number of simple evidence-based measures might be 
evident: 
 
1. Has board composition changed in the last year?  
 
 Wider stakeholder engagement commences at the top and seeks to incorporate 
 diversity, gender, nationalities and ethnicities. Kang et al.42 argue that diversity can 
 be either visible (race, ethnicity gender, age etc) or less visible (educational, 
 industry experience). Heterogeneity results in a broader perspective and generates 
 differing alternatives. We would expect to see banks and financial  institutions 
 reporting a wider level of alternative recruitment portfolios at board level to 
 move them away from the social habitus notions prevalent at organizations such as, 
 RBS.43 
 
2. Has the nature of the buyer-supplier relationship altered? 
 
 Evidence here would be the establishment of relationships not entirely dependent  on 
 economics but enhancing wider stakeholder notions such as, sustainability, locality 
 and support for ethnic minority businesses. 
 
3. Do your employees and customers like you more? 
 
 We would have expectations that annual assessments of customer satisfaction 
 would be detailed and specify ‘the what’ and ‘the how’ of stakeholder 
 improvement. 
 
4. Do you dare let others assess your performance beyond the annual report? 
 
Assessments by corporate governance consultants on the performance of directors 
made public in annual reports or tabled at annual general meetings.  
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A truly engaging stakeholder aware board of directors would subject itself to 360-degree 
feedback from a number of sources and be seen to act on the results. 
 
 
Conclusions and Commentary  
The objectives of section 172 and recent discussions regarding reforms clearly focus on 
directors’ engagement with stakeholders. However, even with refinements to governance 
codes and legal requirements strengthened to hold directors accountable in the hope of 
reducing the number of failures, the problem will still persist. The solution to the conundrum 
of corporate failure might not rest with more reform, but with enhancing leadership. To 
achieve accountability, leadership should be at the core, legal duties as the default rules to 
remedy failure and CG Codes providing and infrastructure and support. 
 
This paper has argued that financial companies should be looking at strengthening the 
diversity role of their directors as well as ensuring they behave as leaders. Leadership as 
argued is showing the way, ensuring independence and diversity at the top and developing 
the skillsets of leaders towards establishing compliance cultures. We suggest boards will need 
to provide evidence of dealing with differing stakeholders and reporting the results of those 
engagement using a number of simple evidence-based measures. 
 
However, leadership is neither a replacement nor a substitute for the laws and governance 
codes.  They are complementary; if directors cannot reflect their stakeholders and cannot 
lead, they should not be appointed to leadership positions of companies. The means of 
bridging the gap of CG Code and the law is Leadership in Compliance. Compliance in a 
multi-stakeholder business environment requires directors to articulate their engagement and 
account for how decisions were made in view of interaction with various stakeholders. 
Stanton who research on the causes of corporate failures in the US wrote:44 
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Feedback is a gift. Without soliciting and accepting feedback from knowledge able 
people, an executive can make serious mistakes. The point of feedback is to raise 
questions that prompt the gathering of more information so that major decisions, when 
they are made, reflect a robust understanding of the context and implications. 
In sum, directors of the multi-stakeholder business environment meant that no stakeholder 
should be taken for granted. There is one stakeholder directors in the financial sector have to 
pay particular attention that is the FCA. The key is Leadership in Compliance where directors 
have to ensure regulatory accountability is achieved. 
 
 
 
